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In Pakistan‟s struggles with Islamist militant groups—foreign and homegrown—the 
country‟s provinces have experienced levels of violence that differ widely by type, 
severity, and consequences.  An analysis of a recent WorldPublicOpinion.org poll of 
Pakistan reveals that these different provinces vary significantly in their views of militant 
groups and the recent government actions to an extent that is relevant for policymakers. 
Of special interest, support for the Pakistani government‟s efforts and concern about 
specific militant groups prove to be strong in some unexpected places.  
 
Pakistan is home to numerous ethnic groups, who tend to be clustered in specific 
provinces, e.g.: Punjabis tends to be clustered in the Punjab, Pashtuns in the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP), the Baluch in Baluchistan and Sindhis in Sindh. Of course, 
there has been tremendous migration within Pakistan.  Karachi, in Sindh, is now home to 
more Pashtuns than any other city in Pakistan and ethnic Punjabis are settled throughout 
Pakistan.  Indeed, these internal demographic changes have often been a source of 
conflict among different ethnic groups. 
 
While many U.S. analysts focus upon “Pakistan” and “Pakistani opinions,” it is useful to 
consider sub-national analyses of data.  For example, provinces differ by voting patterns, 
access to education and other public services, representation in government institutions 
(including the armed forces), and literacy, among other factors.  These enormous inter-
provincial differences tend to be overlooked by policy makers. 
 
This paper begins with the opinion survey‟s timing, its methodology, and a few caveats 
on its provincial comparisons.  It then offers a brief summary of provincial differences in 
attitudes.  It then considers the provincial responses to specific questions on three topics: 
beliefs about Islamist militants‟ activities and objectives; views of the Pakistani 
government and its response to the militants, especially in Swat; and attitudes toward 
foreign militant groups, the Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda.   
 
The Timing of the Study 
 
In March 2009, the efforts of the NWFP provincial government to strike a deal with the 
Pakistani Taliban—offering Shari‟a courts in Swat in exchange for peace—was formally 
endorsed by Pakistan‟s Parliament and President Zardari.  In the last week of April the 
Pakistani Taliban extended its reach, moving into Buner, and the government and army 
reacted forcefully soon afterward with a major offensive.  The survey was fielded in late 
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May during a key phase of the army‟s offensive against the Pakistani Taliban, coinciding 
with heavy street-to-street fighting in the Swat Valley‟s main town, Mingora.  
 
Methodology and a Caveat 
 
The differences between provinces selected for discussion in this paper are very large 
ones.  The smallest variations reported here are in the 20-point range; most are in the 30-
50 point range.  The variations in each question offered are at the p<.001 level of 
significance. The paper seeks to discuss and interpret only these very robust differences.   
 
The survey of the national population of Pakistan was developed by 
WorldPublicOpinion.org, with the author contributing to the study‟s conceptualization 
and the design of the survey instrument.  It was carried out by SEDCO (Socio-Economic 
Development Consultants, Islamabad, Pakistan).  All interviewing was conducted in 
Urdu. A total of 1,000 face-to-face interviews were conducted across 64 primary 
sampling units in rural areas and 36 in urban areas. In order to properly capture opinion 
in Baluchistan (a multi-ethnic, sparsely populated province), it was oversampled, using 
15 primary sampling units; results were then weighted back to reflect true proportions 
among provinces. Interviews were conducted between May 17 and 28, 2009. Sampling 
error for a sample of this size is approximately +/-3.2 percentage points.  
 
Even so, given the sample size, there are limits to how fine disaggregation can be, due to 
Pakistan‟s population distribution.  For example, Baluchistan is the largest province in 
geographical size, but it is home to only 5 percent of the country‟s population, according 
the most recent census in 1998.  Moreover, Baluchistan is ethnically diverse, including 
Baluch, Pashtuns and Punjabis with Baluch and Pashtuns concentrated in different parts 
of the province. While the survey over-sampled Baluchistan, it is still possible that the 
Baluchistan sample does not perfectly reflect ethnic distributions within the province. 
Thus tabulations for Baluchistan in particular must be viewed with these caveats in mind.  




That said, it is clear that the study‟s questions about the Swat crisis, the government‟s 
response, and various Islamist militant organizations elicited differences across provinces 
so large and robust that they merit consideration.     
 
A Brief Summary of Provincial Differences 
 
In general, the NWFP and Punjab  have experienced most intensively the ravages of 
violence from the Pakistani Taliban and allied militant groups (including foreign 
militants) while also being closest to the state‟s military and police efforts to counter 
these militant groups.    In contrast, both Sindh and Baluchistan have experienced other 
kinds of violence in the past, but they have been relatively spared the predations of the 
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Pakistani Taliban.  Perhaps for these reasons, we see considerable differences across the 
provinces.    This is true for Baluchistan even though  the Afghan Taliban has long used 
Baluchistan  territory as a sanctuary, without making Baluchistan itself a focus of 
operations.  
 
The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) is the province that has experienced the 
greatest amount of extremist violence (with Punjab a close second).  Since 2004 militant 
groups have sought to set up micro-emirates in the province (as well as in the nearby 
Pashtun areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)).  It includes the actual 
battlefield of the army‟s offensive and currently more than 2 million of its population are 
displaced, according to various estimates. 
 
NWFP respondents were more likely than others to see local Taliban and Islamist 
militants as critical threats to Pakistan.  They were more inclined to see the Pakistani 
Taliban as holding a nationwide takeover as an objective, and to see this as a real 
possibility.  Though they expressed some confidence in the government and army‟s 
handling of this situation, they were less likely to express strong confidence.   
 
Punjab is the richest, most highly developed and most populous province in Pakistan.  
The Punjab is considered by the security elites to be the “heartland” of Pakistan and is 
home to numerous army corps, intelligence agencies, and industrial and other 
infrastructure.  Abutting India‟s province of the same name, Punjab remains for many 
purposes a strategic territory to be fiercely protected and is the cultural center for many of 
Pakistan‟s elites, notably the army.  While parts of Punjab have long witnessed sectarian 
violence (between Shi‟ia and Sunnis), in recent years Punjab too has witnessed 
sanguinary attacks on police, military, intelligence and other state targets, including 
suicide attacks. Thus, Punjab—along with NWFP and the Federal Territory of 
Islamabad—has become a prized theatre of operations for the Pakistani Taliban.  
 
Punjab respondents were, like those in the NWFP, more likely to see local Taliban and 
Islamist militants as a critical threat, but—unlike those in the war zone--they were also 
the most likely to express strong confidence in the government and army‟s handling of 
Swat.  They also led the provinces in thinking it very unlikely that the Pakistani Taliban 
could ever take over the country.   
 
Baluchistan has seen almost no violence from the Pakistani Taliban.  It has a long 
history of periodic Baluch insurgencies against the central government, aiming for 
autonomy or independence.  These insurgencies have been organized around ethnic 
identity, plus grievances against perceived economic exploitation of the province.  This is 
a political problem for Pakistan quite distinct from the better known issue of Islamist 
militancy.  Although the Afghan Taliban has long made its home in Baluchistan, it has 
never sought to extend its writ in that province through violence; it has kept its focus on 
Afghanistan instead. 
 
Baluch respondents were somewhat less likely to see religious militants as a critical 
threat to Pakistan, and almost all thought the Pakistani Taliban has no national aspirations 
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to power.  They were less likely to either sympathize with the government in the Swat 
conflict, or to show confidence in government handling of the conflict.  They were less 
concerned about al Qaeda--but also less likely to sympathize with its attacks on 
Americans.  When presented the idea of the Pakistani government acting to close down 
Taliban or al Qaeda camps, they were less likely to be supportive. 
 
Sindh has also seen almost no violence from the Pakistani Taliban with a few notable 
exceptions. (For example, Baitullah Mehsood may have been responsible for the suicide 
attack upon Benazir Bhutto in Karachi in the fall of 2007).  Sindh has experienced 
sporadic bouts of ethnic violence among ethnic Sindhis, Muhajjirs, Baluch, Pashtuns and 
Punjabis as well as sectarian violence among Shi‟a and Sunni militias.  Notably, 
individuals who migrated to Pakistan from areas in India either during partition or shortly 
thereafter (Muhajjirs) have long sought greater autonomy within the province to secure 
their interests.  Muhajjir efforts to appropriate the province have been fiercely resisted by 
Sindhi ethnics, as well as Pashtuns and Baluch, who also share the province and its 
burgeoning port city of Karachi.  Moreover, Sindh has witnessed decades of sectarian 
violence as well as organized criminal activity and episodic bouts of severe state efforts, 
using police, military and paramilitary forces, to roust varied entrepreneurs of violence. 
 
Sindh respondents were the most likely to avoid expressing sympathies with either side in 
the Swat conflict.  However, where Taliban or al Qaeda camps on Pakistani soil are 
concerned, Sindh respondents were the most likely to support the Pakistani government 
using force if necessary to close them down. 
 
Beliefs about Islamist Militants’ Activities and Objectives 
 
Broadly, the NWFP and Punjab have a 
considerably stronger belief that Islamist 
militant groups are a grave threat than 
the rest of the country has--and this is 
especially true of these two provinces‟ 
perception of the Pakistani Taliban. 
 
Respondents were asked to evaluate two 
kinds of threats to Pakistan over the next 
ten years.   
 
First they were asked whether the 
“Islamist militants and local Taliban in 
FATA and the settled areas” posed such a threat.  Respondents in the Punjab, Sindh and 
NWFP overwhelmingly believed they were a “critical threat.” Respondents in 
Baluchistan were less likely to say so. However, when one adds those who indicated that 
these groups are an “important but not critical threat,” solid majorities across all 
provinces see these groups as a threat to some degree.  
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The substantially stronger threat perception in NWFP and Punjab likely reflect the reality 
that these provinces have born the brunt of militant violence with a sustained Pakistani 
Taliban suicide bombing campaign largely focused upon these provinces. 
 
Second, respondents were asked to 
evaluate whether the “activities of 
religious militant groups in Pakistan as a 
whole” posed a critical threat, important 
but not critical, or not a threat at all. 
Results were similar to those above with 
respondents in NWFP and Punjab 
evidencing a substantially stronger threat 
perception than those in Baluchistan and 
Sindh. Again, this is likely because most 
of the Islamist militant violence has 
focused upon the NWFP and Punjab in 
recent years. 
 
Respondents were also asked a series of questions about the goals of the Pakistan Taliban 
and their views about this outcome if the Pakistani Taliban were to succeed. It should be 
recalled that this survey was fielded right after the Taliban reneged on the April 2009 
“peace deal” in the settled area of Swat and made startling advances into Buner in 
absolute breach of that controversial agreement.  
 
Respondents were asked whether they 
believe the “Pakistani Taliban have the 
goal of gaining control of all of Pakistan 
and imposing their form of Sharia, or do 
you think they just want to control the 
northwestern part of the country.” (It 
should be noted that the northwestern part 
of Pakistan comprises substantial territory, 
inclusive of the NWFP, the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas and possibly 
part of Baluchistan.) 
 
Respondents in the NWFP and the Punjab were much more likely than those in 
Baluchistan or Sindh to believe that the Pakistani Taliban seeks to control all of Pakistan.  
Again, this could be due to the fact that NWFP and Punjab are either located in or closer 







Respondents were also asked whether or 
not they believe that “it is likely or 
unlikely that the Pakistan Taliban will 
eventually gain control over all of 
Pakistan.” When one looks at the 
proportion of respondents indicating that it 
is either “very likely” or “somewhat 
likely,” a solid majority of respondents in 
the NWFP believed it was likely. Again, 
the NWFP has witnessed the Pakistan 
Taliban setting up micro-emirates of 
Sharia since 2004 both in the NWFP and 
the tribal areas of FATA. Majorities in Punjab, Baluchistan and Sindh thought it was 
“somewhat unlikely” or “very unlikely” that they would eventually control the country.  
 
Respondents were next asked about the 
outcome of such a takeover if it were to 
happen. Solid majorities in all provinces 
thought that it would be either „somewhat 
bad” or “very bad.”  Again respondents in 
NWFP and Punjab were much more likely 
to believe that such an outcome would be 
“very bad.” However, small minorities 
(ranging from eight percent to nearly 20 
percent) in all provinces believed that such 
an outcome would be “very good” or 
“somewhat good.” 
 
Thus the NWFP and Punjab would be most likely to show support for measures that may 
be taken against the Pakistani Taliban in future, since they are the most inclined to regard 
the organization as a serious threat. 
 
Views of the Government and its Response 
 
Respondents were asked a series of 
questions about their views of the 
Pakistani government and its handling of 
the militants‟ challenge.  The NWFP and 
Punjab both overwhelmingly sympathize 
with the government in the Swat conflict, 
but Punjab shows more confidence in the 
outcome than the NWFP does.  Sindh has 
the least sympathy for the government of 
all the provinces, and (along with 
Baluchistan) is most inclined to think it 
was right thing to try to make an 
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agreement with the Pakistani Taliban.  
 
Respondents were asked whether they “sympathize more with the government or with the 
Pakistani Taliban.” Respondents could also answer “both” or “neither.” Respondents in 
the Punjab and the NWFP were most likely to sympathize with the government.  Again, 
NWFP and Punjab have born the brunt of the violence, and for this reason, respondents in 
those provinces may be more inclined to support the government‟s renewed fight against 
the Pakistani Taliban in Swat and elsewhere. Conversely, respondents in Sindh and 
Baluchistan were less likely to sympathize with the government and residents of 
Baluchistan were most likely to sympathize with the Taliban.   
 
There are two possible explanations for the result in Baluchistan. First, it may be a 
manifestation of Baluch resentment of the central government.  Baluchistan has been the 
site of a long-standing insurgency wherein various militant groups demand independence 
or greater autonomy, control over provincial resources and increased access to state 
institutions.  Thus support for the Pakistan Taliban, which targets the state, may be seen 
as an anti-Pakistan vote. Second, the Afghan Taliban has long made its home in 
Baluchistan; however, it has never sought to extend its writ in that province through 
violence.  (It is also possible that the Baluchistan sample focused upon Pashtun areas 
which may be more positively disposed towards both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.) 
 
Sindh registers considerable ambivalence towards the government and Taliban, with a 
plurality indicating that their sympathies lie with “both/neither.” Again, this could 
register the negative sentiment of some ethnic groups in Sindh. (Sindh has been home to 
various levels of ethnic violence and ethnic demands for greater autonomy.)  
 
When asked how confident respondents 
are in how the “government is dealing 
with the situation in Malakand area in and 
around Swat,” residents of the NWFP 
were most unlikely to have “a lot” of 
confidence. NWFP has experienced 
sustained--if brutal and devastating--army 
operations which have demolished vast 
swaths of residential areas and displaced 
millions of persons fleeing the army-led 
and militant-led violence.  Moreover, 
neither the military nor the government 
has a convincing plan for providing long-term stability or for reconstruction and 
rehabilitation of the internally displaced persons.  
 
These realities notwithstanding, a solid majority of respondents in the NWFP has some 
degree of confidence in the government. Respondents in Baluchistan, Sindh and Punjab 
were most likely to indicate “a lot” of confidence. However, residents in Sindh and 
Baluchistan were divided, with as many indicating that they have “just a little” or no 




When asked about their confidence in the 
way in which the military is dealing with 
the Pakistani Taliban, persons surveyed in 
Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan were most 
likely to indicate that they have “a lot” of 
confidence.  Respondents from the NWFP 
were the least likely to have a lot of 
confidence in the military‟s handling of 
affairs.  That said, a solid majority of 
respondents in the NWFP indicated that 
they have “some” confidence. 
Respondents in Sindh and Baluchistan 
also had large minorities who had “just a 
little” or “no” confidence.  
 
Respondents were also asked whether the 
agreement between the government and 
the Pakistani Taliban was the “right thing 
to do” or “whether the government made a 
mistake.”   Respondents in Baluchistan 
and Sindh were the least likely to view it 
as a mistake. Baluchistan and Sindh have 
seen virtually no Pakistani Taliban-related 
violence.  The Punjab had the lowest 
percentage believing that the deal was the 
right thing to do.  Opinion was divided in 
the NWFP, with nearly equal numbers 
believing it was the right thing to do or a 
mistake.  The NWFP‟s divided response 
may be understandable, given that 
residents there have been battered by the military as well as the Taliban.  
 
Should the government again attempt this type of agreement with an Islamist militant 
group, it will be important to realize that the two northern provinces, which have seen 
much of the violence proffered by these groups, have more negative views of such 
agreements.  
 
Attitudes Toward Foreign Militants: The Afghan Taliban and al Qaeda 
 
Punjab is the only province where large numbers see al Qaeda as a critical threat to 
Pakistan, reject al Qaeda‟s attacks on Americans, and do not agree with its general views 
of the US.  These three attitudes—which to Americans may seem to naturally follow one 
from another—do not naturally follow for many Pakistanis.   
 
The NWFP is not so uncomfortable with al Qaeda‟s attacks and hostility toward the US, 
but does think al Qaeda is a critical threat to Pakistan.  The NWFP would support the 
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government closing down al Qaeda training camps (and Afghan Taliban bases as well).  
Views in Sindh are broadly similar to those in the NWFP, though with less sympathy for 
attacks on Americans.   
 
The Baluch are least likely to see al Qaeda as a critical threat.  They tend to reject its 
attacks on Americans while sharing many of its views of the US, and are divided over the 
idea of closing down camps and bases within Pakistan. 
 
When asked whether Bin Laden‟s 
organization, al Qaeda, posed a long-term 
threat to Pakistan itself, respondents in the 
Punjab, Sindh and NWFP overwhelmingly 
believed he and his organization posed a 
“critical threat.” Persons surveyed in 
Baluchistan were less likely to see him 
and his outfit as a “critical threat.” 
However, those who saw him as a 
“critical” and “important but not critical 
threat” comprised a solid majority.  
 
Regarding al Qaeda and attacks against 
the United States, respondents were asked 
about their views of al Qaeda. 
Respondents indicated whether they 
“support its attacks on Americans and 
share its attitudes towards the US,” 
“oppose its attacks on Americans but 
share many of its attitudes towards the 
US,” or “Oppose its attacks on Americans 
and do not share its attitudes toward the 
US.”  
 
There was considerable variation across the provinces. In the Punjab, more residents 
(nearly 40%) than any other province indicated that they both oppose the attacks and do 
not share al Qaeda‟s views of the US.  Approximately one in five in the Punjab indicated 
that they both share al Qaeda‟s views of the US and support its attacks on Americans. 
Another one in five espoused al Qaeda‟s views of the US but rejected such attacks. 
 
Residents in Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan were all more likely than those in the Punjab 
to share many of al Qaeda‟s views of the US, but there was considerable difference in 
support for attacks on the United States. Residents of NWFP who share al Qaeda‟s goals 
were nearly divided between those who support attacks against the United States (47%) 
and those who do not (44%). Residents of Baluchistan predominantly rejected attacks on 
the United States but said they shared many of al Qaeda‟s views of the US.  Again, this is 
puzzling given Baluchistan‟s proximity to the fighting in Afghanistan.  One possible 
explanation is that, having to live cheek by jowl with organizations that include foreign 
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fighters, many Baluch express sympathy with their goals but do not want to “enlist” with 
them by supporting attacks.  
 
Respondents were also asked whether 
their feelings towards Osama bin Laden 
were “positive,” “mixed,” or “negative.” 
Residents of NWFP were more likely than 
those in any other province to have 
positive feelings towards Osama bin 
Laden (51%)—consistent with their higher 
approval of al Qaeda‟s attacks on 
Americans. Persons surveyed from the 
Punjab and Baluchistan were most likely 
to hold negative views of bin Laden (41% 
and 46% respectively)—consistent with 
their lower approval of al Qaeda‟s attacks.  In Sindh opinion was relatively evenly 
divided across categories. 
 
Respondents were also asked about al 
Qaeda training camps in Pakistan.  
Respondents were asked whether or not 
the Pakistan government should close 
camps associated with Bin Laden‟s 
organization, al Qaeda.  Respondents in 
Sindh and the Punjab were most likely to 
support such measures, followed by those 
in the NWFP. Those from Baluchistan, 
however, were divided, with nearly equal 
numbers supporting and opposing such 
closures.  Perhaps some Baluch 
respondents were concerned about military measures against al Qaeda spilling more 
widely into the province‟s territory.   
 
Respondents were also asked about 
Taliban bases in Pakistan: “If the Pakistani 
government were to identify bases in 
Pakistan of Taliban groups who are trying 
to overthrow the Afghan government, do 
you think the government should or 
should not close these bases even if it 
requires the use of military force?”  
Respondents in Sindh overwhelmingly 
supported such closures and so did strong 
majorities in Punjab and in the NWFP 
(though in the latter a significant 29% 
disagreed).   Baluch were again divided, responding in the same way as they did when 
asked about closing down al Qaeda training camps. 
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It appears that popular support for a push to close down foreign Islamist militants‟ camps 
in Pakistan would require the national government choosing to do this and offering strong 
domestic Pakistani reasons for doing it.  Most Pakistanis are unlikely to want to join such 
an effort as part of an “anti-terrorist international”—as it has often been put to them in 




These inter-provincial results across several pressing policy issues demonstrate the 
importance of examining Pakistani views sub-nationally. Clearly there are wide 
variations in public views about these issues—variations which appear related to different 
provincial experiences of proximity to war, insurgency, and more scattered violence and 
intimidation from militant groups.    
 
As the United States tries to craft its information policies towards Pakistan‟s polity, and 
as the Pakistan government communicates with its citizenry about its actions, it would be 
wise for the US and Pakistani governments to better grasp how people across Pakistan 
variously understand the problems facing their nation, and how they evaluate the state‟s 
efforts to contend with its threat environment. 
 
